On September 9th, Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL) closed at 336.84 yuan per share, down about 27% from its intraday high of 467 yuan in May, with its total market value evaporating by approximately 600 billion yuan. This sharp decline stands in stark contrast to the company's impressive earnings performance: in the first half of the year, CATL's net profit attributable to shareholders reached 43.3 billion yuan, earning over 2 billion yuan per day—more than double the combined profits of 15 major listed automakers. Some investors lamented, "Even the mighty 'Ning Wang' has fallen this hard," and joked, "Ningzi, how about hosting a new product launch? Ning Wang has turned into Ningzi!"

Why the relentless decline? Lithium carbonate prices have collapsed, and the 'de-CATL' movement is also accelerating. On the surface, CATL's recent slide appears driven by the sharp drop in lithium carbonate futures. Since September, lithium carbonate futures have fallen from about 160,000 yuan per ton to roughly 140,000 yuan per ton, a cumulative decline of over 11%. Logically, lower lithium prices should be a cost benefit for battery makers, but the market's interpretation is quite the opposite: lithium prices serve as a demand thermometer, and a decline signals weakening downstream demand. However, what worries the market even more is the acceleration of the "de-CATL" trend. In September, Xiaomi launched its "Longjia Battery," announcing full integration across its Pengcheng series, while also partnering with CALB and Sunwoda. Li Auto announced that its entire vehicle lineup will feature self-developed batteries, with the L8, L6, and i8 models already adopting them. Previously, Harmony Intelligent Mobility, Xpeng, Leapmotor, and GAC Aion had also introduced second or multiple battery suppliers.

Adding to the concerns, CATL unveiled a 20-40 billion yuan share buyback plan in July, touted as the largest single buyback in A-share history, yet it has not been implemented so far. The market can't help but wonder: is the company itself waiting for a cheaper price? At the beginning of this month, at the World Power Battery Conference, Robin Zeng "lashed out" at the chaos of new energy vehicle development, and the market's reaction was quite nuanced. He stated that over 600 new car models have been launched domestically this year, nearly three per day on average; some power battery products have experienced batch failures, which he described as "shocking"; and the industry's focus on "speed, parameters, and price" is sacrificing quality and consumer trust. Some quipped, "You, a supplier, dare to criticize your clients—is it because they're not using your batteries?" Another joked, "Is Chairman Zeng getting anxious? First he criticized competitors, now he's even taking aim at his own customers."

The resentment against 'Ning Wang' is widespread. Automakers' desire to "de-CATL" stems from a shared sentiment: they don't want to work for "Ning Wang." The semi-annual report shows that CATL generated revenue of 276.92 billion yuan in the first half of the year, up 54.8% year-on-year, with net profit attributable to shareholders reaching 43.28 billion yuan, up nearly 42%—both growth rates hitting three-year highs. On a rough estimate, CATL generated daily revenue of 1.52 billion yuan and netted 240 million yuan per day during the period. Both of CATL's major business segments achieved substantial growth: power battery revenue rose 46% to 192.13 billion yuan, while energy storage battery revenue surged 87.5% to 5.36 billion yuan. While CATL feasts on meat, automakers struggle to even sip the soup. According to statistics, the combined net profit attributable to shareholders of 15 major listed automakers in the first half totaled 21.05 billion yuan—meaning CATL alone earned more than double that amount. This lopsided profit distribution is also strikingly reflected in personal wealth. In the 2026 Hurun Global Rich List, seven individuals from CATL made the list, with combined wealth reaching 723 billion yuan, of which Robin Zeng ranked 33rd globally with 380 billion yuan. Investors couldn't help but exclaim, "Three years of toil and struggle, building cars is no match for batteries," "Fluid automakers, but a solid supplier," and "Automakers work their tails off all year, only to find they're all working for CATL."

Yet hidden dangers lurk beneath CATL's formidable earning power. In the first half of 2026, CATL's comprehensive gross margin stood at 23.93%, down about 1.1 percentage points. In the second quarter alone, it fell to 23.15%, another 1.66 percentage points lower quarter-on-quarter, showing a clear downward trend. Second-tier battery manufacturers continue their price offensive, and if they keep competing on price to win orders, CATL's profit margins will face further pressure. A report from CLSA noted that CATL's gross margin performance was unexpected, primarily due to intense downstream price competition, which prevented cost pass-through in the second quarter, likely putting near-term pressure on the stock price. The firm cut its net profit forecasts for CATL from this year through 2028 by 1% to 4%, reflecting expectations of lower gross margins.

Undeniably, CATL's position remains solid. In the first half of this year, CATL's domestic power battery installation share reached 46%, up 3 percentage points year-on-year. However, when zooming in to monthly data, the problem emerges. In June, CATL's domestic market share dropped to 42.7%, down 3.43 percentage points from May. Meanwhile, BYD rebounded strongly, and second-tier players like CALB, Gotion High-Tech, and EVE Energy all posted positive share growth. The overseas market is one of CATL's key growth avenues. From January to May 2026, the company's overseas power battery market share reached 33.7%, up 3.7 percentage points year-on-year. This growth is mainly attributed to the shift toward lithium iron phosphate technology in the European market—domestic companies are rapidly eating into the share of Japanese and Korean rivals thanks to cost advantages. However, the overseas market base remains relatively low, and with the uncertainty of trade protectionist policies, the sustainability of overseas share gains is still highly uncertain.

In conclusion, what the capital market is really betting on is how much moat CATL will retain three to five years down the line. Will it be gradually eroded by second-tier manufacturers, becoming an ordinary manufacturing leader earning hard-earned profits? Or will it continue to be the admired "Ning Wang" through technological barriers and new business ventures? There is no definitive answer yet, and the stock price is currently serving as the market's way of seeking one.